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Summary 
 
The contemporary focus on good governance reforms in developing countries is 
based on developing market-enhancing governance capabilities of states. If 
successful, this type of governance should make markets more efficient. However, 
the evidence in support of these reforms is poor. Cross-sectional evidence can be 
used to extract some support for the importance of market-enhancing governance, 
but the data is weak and can support a number of different results. Some of this 
evidence is presented in this paper, and we argue that it actually supports the view 
that ‘good governance’ reforms are difficult to implement in any developing 
country. Rapidly growing countries in general did not enjoy better market-
enhancing governance conditions compared to the others. If some developing 
countries nevertheless succeeded in achieving sustained convergence, they must 
have had other governance capabilities that allowed them to achieve this. 
 
We argue that these capabilities can be described as growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities. Theory and evidence suggests that growth requires 
governance capabilities in at least three closely interrelated processes. The first 
involves the capabilities of states to manage non-market asset transfers that are 
endemic at early stages of development. Structural reasons explain why property 
right stability is never achieved at early stages of development. As a result, 
sustainable growth has not depended on the ex ante achievement of stable property 
rights, but rather on governance capabilities for managing non-market asset 
transfers to accelerate productive investment while allowing productive investors 
to have stable expectations about future rewards. Secondly, developing countries 
have to adapt strategies to acquire technologies and learn new ways of organizing 
work and using knowledge. These learning processes take time and involve costs 
that have to be covered either by the state or private investors. By definition, this 
involves the creation and management of rents. Success in rapid technology 
acquisition has therefore been associated with governance capabilities enabling 
states to effectively discipline learning processes and manage the rents involved. 
Finally, sustained growth requires the maintenance of political stability in a context 
where patron-client politics is structural and difficult to change in the short run. 
Success or failure is not therefore associated with the achievement of Weberian 
states at early stages of development. But success has depended on governance 
capabilities allowing states to manage political stability through patron-client 
politics at relatively low cost without excessively disrupting productive investment 
and learning. All of these governance capabilities are different from the ones 
identified in the market-enhancing approach. 
 
There is no conflict between the development of market-enhancing and growth-
enhancing governance, except that a one-sided and exclusive focus on the former 
can waste resources on unattainable (though highly desirable) objectives while 
creating frustration and demoralization in developing countries because true 
sustainability is not being enhanced.  
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Most economists would agree that governance is one of the critical factors 
determining the growth prospects of countries. However, there is considerable 
controversy about governance priorities and the types of governance capabilities that 
are critical. These disagreements are related to fundamental disagreements on the role 
of markets versus other social, political and technological characteristics that need to 
be fulfilled for sustainable growth to take off. The contemporary good governance 
agenda is based largely on governance capabilities that are required to create the 
conditions for markets to be efficient. While these are important and desirable 
conditions, we argue that they are second order conditions, in the sense that without 
other state capacities that directly promote sustainable growth, market conditions for 
efficiency are on their own insufficient and ultimately unsustainable.  
 
The point about sustainability of particular reforms is particularly important. There 
are a number of critical structural features of developing countries that prevent the 
achievement of significant progress on the good governance front. These factors make 
the good governance agenda doubly problematic: it sets many developing countries 
goals they cannot achieve, and in addition, even if they could have been achieved, 
these goals are not sufficient to ensure sustainable growth. The task of this paper is to 
outline some of the governance issues that we already know about, and identify other 
areas where more research is necessary to assist policy.  
 
1. Three phases in the history of governance and growth policies  
It is useful to recall that the consensus on economic policy and appropriate 
governance capacities for developing countries has gone through radical changes over 
the last fifty years. The first phase of growth and governance policies describes the 
economic strategies adopted by most developing countries from their decolonization 
at different stages of the last fifty years to sometime in the early 1980s. The concern 
of most developing countries and international agencies during this period was to 
accelerate the creation of growth-enhancing sectors in developing countries. 
However, they failed to give much attention to the development of governance 
capabilities appropriate for the effective implementation of these strategies. The 
governance discussion that did take place came from the modernization school that 
tried to justify the lack of democracy and the presence of corruption in many of the 
developing countries that had become Cold War allies of the US during this period 
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(Huntington 1968). Critically, there was no discussion within developing countries 
about the governance capabilities required to effectively implement the different 
growth strategies they were following.  
 
The results of this first phase of post-colonial growth strategies were therefore very 
mixed. A few countries did break out of poverty in a sustained way by the late 1960s. 
These countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, emerged by the late 1960s as 
emerging economic giants (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). A number of other countries 
like Brazil, Pakistan and India initially achieved much higher growth rates compared 
to their growth rates in the first half of the twentieth century. But in these countries 
productivity growth in the emerging industrial sectors was not high enough and there 
was a growing perception by the mid-sixties that these strategies were becoming 
unsustainable. But most worrying was a larger group of countries, many of them in 
Africa, where import-substituting industrialization resulted in much more limited 
growth and industrialization.  
Phase 1. Post-war development policy focus on
i) increasing investment and infrastructure,
ii) creating new capitalists by encouraging rapid asset 
transfers (the modernization thesis),
iii) protection of emerging capitalists using subsidies and 
tariffs to assist catching-up (infant industry protection)
Politics and institutions underplayed:
Authoritarian regimes tolerated on the grounds that 
they allowed high investment rates, accelerated the 
creation of new capitalists and kept communists at bay 
(variants of the modernization thesis)
A few dramatic successes 
in East Asia (such as 
Taiwan and South Korea) 
but many more disastrous 
failures in Asia and Africa 
with authoritarian regimes 
creating unproductive 
elites and infant industries 
that refused to mature
 
Figure 1 Growth-promoting policies that ignored growth-enhancing governance capabilities 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the strategy and governance combination that characterized the 
first phase of development strategies in developing countries. The results, while very 
encouraging for a small number of countries, were not widely-enough shared for this 
strategy to survive in many developing countries, or receive the continued support of 
international agencies. With the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold 
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War imperatives of providing support to undemocratic and corrupt regimes also began 
to suddenly disappear. 
 
A second phase of development policy dates roughly from the 1980s when structural 
adjustment began to be promoted precisely because previous strategies had resulted in 
serious budgetary crises in many developing countries. Rent seeking, corruption and 
other governance issues now became policy concerns, but the expectation was that 
liberalization would resolve these governance issues by removing the incentives for 
rent seeking. John Toye described this as the ‘development counterrevolution’ (Toye 
1987). The results of this phase of policy were, if anything, even more disappointing, 
with no discernible improvements in either the growth prospects of developing 
countries or their governance conditions.  
 
Phase 2. 1980s development policy focus on
neo-liberal policies to cut back subsidies across the 
board to reduce inflation as a precondition for market-
led growth  (structural adjustment )
Political reform expected to follow from the economic 
reforms: ‘Right-sizing’ the state expected to reduce rent 
seeking and corruption (neo-liberal ‘new political 
economy’ and rent-seeking theories)
Although inflation was 
reduced, very poor results 
for growth, poverty 
reduction, and rent 
seeking, particularly in 
Africa and other poorly 
performing countries 
where the main effect was 
often economic recession
While governance reform was not yet at the centre of the reform agenda, reforming 
the state was an essential component of the structural adjustment programme. 
However, it was believed that the reform of the state would follow from and be 
achieved through the structural adjustment itself, by removing the incentives for rent 
seeking and corruption. These ideas followed from the development of what came to 
be known as new political economy. This school was the result of many related 
theoretical contributions (Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; Bhagwati 1982; Bardhan 1984; 
Colander 1984; Alt and Shepsle 1990; Lal and Myint 1996; Bates 2001).  
Figure 2 Structural adjustment attempting indirect governance reforms 
 
The results of structural adjustment policies in the eighties were generally very poor. 
Recessions followed in many African countries, and growth was poor in other 
countries that adopted these policies. More worrying was that despite significant 
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liberalization and cutbacks in subsidies, together with privatization programmes in 
some developing countries, there was little apparent reduction in rent seeking 
anywhere. In almost every country where liberalization was carried out, there 
appeared to be an increase in corruption and rent seeking (Harriss-White 1996; 
Harriss-White and White 1996). The realization that market-promoting governance 
capacities on the part of the state required specific attention led to the third, and 
current stage of governance approaches.  
 
The poor performance of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s led to the 
emergence of a new focus on the role of the state to ensure the conditions necessary 
for market economies to work efficiently. The development of New Institutional 
Economics had brought to the fore economic theories that identified governance 
capabilities that states needed to have to create the conditions for low transaction cost 
(efficient) markets. In addition, the poor performance in the 1980s and the growing 
perception of persistent poverty in developing countries also brought to the fore the 
requirement of pro-poor service delivery as a necessary capability for developing 
country states. The convergence of these different perspectives led to the emergence 
of a set of policy priorities for governance in developing countries that has come to be 
known as the good governance agenda.  
 
Many of these governance conditions were also desirable on their own: low 
corruption, democratic accountability, the rule of law and pro-poor service delivery. 
With the end of the Cold War, many constituencies, including many civil society 
organizations in developing countries had been demanding these conditions in 
developing countries. The coming together of a large number of different 
constituencies behind the good governance agenda explains its impressive influence 
and hold in the development community. But while many people in developing 
countries demand good governance as an end, the governance policy agenda sees it as 
a set of preconditions to enable market-driven development to take off.  
 
The new consensus builds on the earlier commitment to liberalization and market-
driven growth, but now the development of good governance capabilities has come to 
occupy the heart of development strategy. As the good governance approach began to 
be adopted as the mainstream development agenda in the 1990s, a few countries had 
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already been enjoying accelerated growth since the mid-1980s by finding niches in 
increasingly integrated global value chains. Most of these growth experiences were, 
however, based on already existing comparative advantages that some developing 
countries had developed. Economic performance in many of the poorest developing 
countries remains low, and growth in others is based on vulnerable low technology 
sectors and commodities that are sensitive to terms of trade changes and are unlikely 
to display the growth in productivity that is necessary to achieve sustainable 
improvements in living standards.  
Phase 3. 1990s economic policy remains focussed on 
market-led economic growth (based on already existing 
comparative advantage) (deepening liberalization)
Political and institutional policy to focus state capacities 
on market-promoting governance: reforms of property 
rights, rule of law, anti-corruption, and democratization, 
combined with pro-poor service delivery (good 
governance reforms and the service-delivery state)
Some developing 
countries achieve 
moderate growth through 
low-technology exports 
but many perform poorly. 
The most successful 
developers like China or 
Vietnam do not conform to 
many characteristics of 
the good governance and 
service-delivery models
Figure 3 The good governance agenda as a market-promoting governance strategy 
 
This brief look at the historical evolution of the good governance agenda highlights a 
number of critical observations. Governance capabilities are closely connected to the 
development strategies that states are supporting. The strategies many developing 
countries followed in the sixties and seventies are fundamentally different from the 
ones they are following now. There were successes and failures in each of our three 
phases and these can be related to the match or mismatch of the requirements of the 
economic strategy being followed and the governance capabilities that were required 
for effectively implementing it. To elaborate this critical observation, and to draw out 
the research and policy implications, we will first discuss the theory and evidence 
supporting the good governance agenda. We will then discuss the theory and evidence 
supporting a more extensive view of governance. 
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2. Theory and evidence supporting the good governance agenda. 
The dominant analysis of good governance as a market-promoting governance 
strategy emerged in what we have described as phase 3 of the development strategies 
attempted by developing countries (summarized in Figure 3). Government capabilities 
for delivering good governance were now argued to be essential for maintaining 
efficient markets and restricting the activities of states to the provision of necessary 
public goods so as to minimize rent seeking and government failure. The relative 
failure of many developing country states during the first phase of development 
strategy could be explained (by good governance theories) in terms of attempts by 
states to do too much. This resulted in the unleashing of unproductive rent seeking 
activities and the crowding out of productive market ones. Empirical support in 
favour of this argument is based on cross-sectional data on governance in developing 
countries that shows that in general, countries with better governance defined in these 
terms performed better.  
 
Box 1. Are efficient markets sufficient for development? 
 
The importance of markets in fostering and enabling economic development is 
not in question. Economic development is likely to be more rapid if markets 
mediating resource allocation (in any country) become more efficient.  
 
The policy debate is rather about  
i) the extent to which markets can be made efficient in developing countries, 
and  
ii) whether maximizing the efficiency of markets (and certainly maximizing 
their efficiency to the degree that is achievable in developing countries) is 
sufficient to maximize the pace of development.  
 
Heterodox growth-promoting approaches to governance have argued that markets are 
inherently inefficient in developing countries and even with the best political will, 
structural characteristics of developing economies ensure that market efficiency will 
remain low till a substantial degree of development is achieved. Given the structural 
limitations of markets in developing countries, successful development requires 
critical governance capacities of states to accelerate private and public accumulation 
and to ensure productivity growth.  
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In support of these arguments, heterodox economists point to the evidence of the 
successful East Asian developers of the last five decades, where strong governance 
capacities existed, but these were typically very different from the good governance 
capacities necessary for ensuring efficient markets. In fact, in terms of the market-
enhancing governance conditions prioritized by the good governance approach, East 
Asian states often performed rather poorly. Instead, they had effective institutions that 
could accelerate growth in conditions characterized by technological backwardness 
and high transaction costs. The heterodox argument is that Asian success can be better 
understood in terms of a different set of governance capabilities that can be described 
as growth-enhancing governance. Growth-enhancing governance should not be 
confused with interventionism. Achieving market-enhancing governance also requires 
intervention. The question is whether the market efficiency that can be feasibly 
achieved in developing countries (through good governance reforms) is sufficient for 
achieving development or is an additional set of governance capabilities required?  
 
The distinction between market-promoting and growth-promoting governance does 
not need to be very starkly drawn, and it is not necessary for policy-makers to choose 
just one or the other. It has been unfortunate that a somewhat artificial chasm emerged 
between these positions with the growing dominance of the liberal economic 
consensus of the 1980s. Indeed there may be important complementarities between 
the two sets of governance requirements in specific areas, provided these can be 
properly identified and prioritized for policy attention. Our intention in reviewing the 
evidence is to show that market-promoting governance as a general goal for 
governance policy is a) difficult to achieve to any significant extent in developing 
countries and b) is insufficient as a condition for ensuring sustained economic growth 
in developing countries. We will then review the evidence to see what we know about 
growth-enhancing governance and the policy implications that follow. 
 
Box 2. Market-enhancing versus growth-enhancing governance 
 
Good governance reforms aim to promote governance capabilities that are 
market-enhancing: they aim to make markets more efficient by reducing 
transaction costs. To the extent that these reforms can be implemented they are 
likely to improve market outcomes in developing countries.  
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However, there are structural problems that prevent significant implementation. 
Moreover, market efficiency does not address significant problems of catching 
up that require specific governance capabilities to assist developing countries 
move up the technology ladder. 
 
Growth-enhancing governance capabilities are capabilities that allow 
developing countries to cope with the property right instability of early 
development, manage technological catching up, and maintain political stability 
in a context of endemic and structural reliance on patron-client politics.  
 
While both sets of governance capabilities are important, the first is not 
significantly achievable in poor countries and an excessive focus on these 
market-enhancing capabilities can take our eye off critical growth-enhancing 
capabilities important for development in these contexts. Ironically, effective 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities can create the preconditions for 
achieving good governance and greater market efficiency over time. 
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1
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Interventions
2
Rent-Seeking and
Corruption
3
Unaccountable 
Government
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Figure 4 Theoretical linkages in the good governance analysis 
The consensus behind the good governance agenda draws heavily on a large body of 
theoretical contributions that were part of the New Institutional Economics that 
emerged in the 1980s. The significant theoretical contribution of this school was to 
point out that efficient markets actually require elaborate governance structures and 
will not just emerge simply because the government withdraws from the economy. 
Although the language varies across this literature, there is a broad consensus that the 
goal of governance should be to enhance these market-enhancing governance 
capabilities of the state (North 1984; Matthews 1986; North 1990, 1995; Clague, et al. 
1997; Olson 1997; Bardhan 2000; Acemoglu, et al. 2004). The main theoretical links 
identified in New Institutional Economics that explain economic stagnation are 
summarized in figure 4.  
 
The fundamental link in all market-focused approaches to development is link 1 in 
figure 4: economic stagnation is explained primarily by inefficient markets. High 
transaction costs are simply a technical description of inefficient markets. These high 
transaction costs are in turn explained by link 2: weak and contested property rights 
and unnecessary state interventions. In the second phase of growth-governance 
policies, the focus of economic policy was limited to link 2 in figure 4 and that too, on 
the removal of unnecessary state interventions as a way of improving the efficiency of 
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markets. As we discussed earlier, the expectation was that these reforms would suffice 
to make markets more efficient through link 1, as well as feed back to reduce rent 
seeking and corruption through link 3 in figure 4 as these links operate in both 
directions and a reduction of intervention reduces the incentives for rent seeking.  
 
The good governance agenda emerged in the third phase of governance policy to 
develop an integrated analysis of market efficiency (Khan 2004). For the first time, 
the argument was that unless all the links in figure 4 were simultaneously addressed, 
market efficiency would not improve. The logic was that rents and interventions could 
not be reduced unless rent seeking and corruption were directly addressed, and in 
turn, these could not be significantly tackled unless the privileges of minorities 
engaged in rent seeking and corruption that harmed the majority could be challenged 
through accountability and democratization. The policy implication was an integrated 
reform agenda summarized in figure 5. 
Economic 
Prosperity
Efficient Markets
Stable Property Rights
Rule of Law
Liberalization
(No economic rents)
No Rent-Seeking
No Corruption
Accountability to the 
Majority
Effective Democracy
Pro-poor 
service 
delivery
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 5 Policy links in the good governance approach 
 
The first theoretical difference compared to earlier approaches was the recognition 
that transaction costs could be high not only because of government interventions, but 
also because governments lacked the capacity to reduce transaction costs by 
effectively protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. Progress required an 
integrated approach on links 3 and 4, to fight corruption and rent seeking that 
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disrupted property rights and contracts, and to ensure accountability to fight 
corruption and rent seeking. A further theoretical development was the idea that pro-
poor service delivery was a way not only of directly attacking poverty, but also of 
empowering the majority and creating expectations that would drive a popular 
demand for greater accountability.  
 
Table 1 shows that all the main policy planks of contemporary governance and 
economic policy reform strategies are derived from the links shown in figure 5. The 
contemporary reforms to improve accountability and pro-poor service delivery (links 
4 and 5 in figure 5) are the theoretical basis of reforms shown in column 1 in table 1. 
Policies to counter corruption and rent seeking that are becoming increasingly 
important in World Bank strategies are derived from link 3, and shown in column 2 of 
table 1. Finally, policies to strengthen property rights and the rule of law are derived 
from link 2 and shown in column 3 of table 1. 
 
Table 1 Contemporary governance priorities and their links to theory 
PRSP, PGBS (in some 
countries),
Accountability 
Reforms, 
Decentralization. 
Policies to Improve 
Accountability of 
Government
(arrows 4 and 5 in 
previous figure)
Anti-corruption 
policies, Liberalization, 
WTO restrictions on 
subsidies, IMF fiscal 
requirements 
Policies to Counter 
Corruption and Rent 
Seeking
(arrow 3 in previous 
figure)
Policies to improve rule 
of law, reduce 
expropriation risk, 
strengthen judiciaries
Policies to Stabilize 
Property Rights across 
the board
(arrow 2 in previous 
figure)
 
The importance of the good governance perspective in informing contemporary 
development policy and discourse cannot be overemphasized. A powerful way of 
evaluating the appropriateness of the relationships between growth and governance 
asserted in the good governance agenda is to look more carefully at some of the data 
and evidence that is used by proponents of the agenda to support the programme.  
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The Empirical Evidence  
The market-enhancing view of governance appears to explain the observation of poor 
performance in many developing countries attempting import-substituting 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Market-enhancing governance capabilities 
were poor in these countries, as was their long-term economic performance. However, 
the test that is required is to see if countries that scored higher in terms of market-
enhancing governance characteristics actually did better in terms of growth. If they 
did, they would be more likely to converge with advanced countries. When we 
conduct such a test we find that the evidence supporting the market-enhancing view 
of governance is weak, even using the largely subjective indicators of governance 
constructed by researchers broadly sympathetic to the theoretical conclusions of the 
good governance analysis.  
 
We find that this data tells us that while poorly performing developing countries did 
indeed fail to meet the governance criteria identified in the market-enhancing view of 
governance, so did high-growth developing countries. These observations are fairly 
systematic, and hold for all the governance indicators and time periods for which we 
have any evidence. The evidence suggests that it may actually be difficult for any 
developing country, regardless of its growth performance, to achieve the governance 
conditions required for efficient markets. This does not mean that market-enhancing 
conditions are irrelevant, but it does mean that we need to qualify some of the claims 
made for prioritizing market-enhancing governance reforms in developing countries. 
 
Making sense of this data is particularly important since an extensive academic 
literature has used the same data to establish a positive relationship between market-
enhancing governance conditions and economic performance (Knack and Keefer 
1995; Mauro 1995; Barro 1996; Clague, et al. 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Johnson, et al. 1998; Hall and Jones 1999; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Lambsdorff 2005). 
This literature typically finds a positive relationship between the two, supporting the 
hypothesis that an improvement in market-enhancing governance conditions will 
promote growth and accelerate convergence with advanced countries. The studies use 
a number of indices of market-enhancing governance. In particular, they use data 
provided by Stephen Knack and the IRIS centre at Maryland University, as well as 
more recent data provided by Kaufmann’s team and available on the World Bank’s 
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website. If market-enhancing governance were relevant for explaining economic 
growth, we would expect the quality of market-enhancing governance at the 
beginning of a period (of say ten years) to have an effect on the economic growth 
subsequently achieved during that period.  
 
However, the Knack-IRIS data set is only available for most countries from 1984 and 
the Kaufmann-World Bank data set from 1996 onwards. We have to test the role of 
market-enhancing governance by using the governance index at the beginning of a 
period of economic performance to see if differences in market-enhancing governance 
explain the subsequent difference in performance between countries. This is 
important, as a correlation between governance indicators at the end of a period and 
economic performance during that period could be picking up the reverse direction of 
causality, where rising per capita incomes result in an improvement in market-
enhancing governance conditions in high growth countries.  
 
There are good theoretical reasons to expect market-enhancing governance to improve 
as per capita incomes increase (as more resources become available in the budget for 
securing property rights, sustainably running democratic systems, policing human 
rights and so on). This reverses the direction of causality between growth and 
governance. Thus, for the Knack-IRIS data, the earliest decade of growth that we can 
examine would be 1980–90, and even here we have to be careful to remember that the 
governance data that we have is for a year almost halfway through the growth period. 
The Knack-IRIS indices are more appropriate for testing the significance of 
governance for economic growth during 1990–2003. The World Bank data on 
governance begins in 1996, and therefore these can at best be used for examining 
growth during 1990–2003, keeping in mind once again that these indices are for a 
year halfway through the period of growth being considered.  
 
Stephen Knack’s IRIS team at the University of Maryland compile their indices using 
country risk assessments based on the responses of relevant constituencies and expert 
opinion (IRIS-3 2000). These provide measures of market-enhancing governance 
quality for a wide set of countries from the early 1980s onwards. This data set 
provides indices for a number of key variables that measure the performance of states 
in providing market-enhancing governance. The five indices in this data set are for  
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1. Corruption in government 
2. Rule of law  
3. Bureaucratic quality  
4. Repudiation of government contracts and  
5. Expropriation risk  
These indices provide a measure of the degree to which governance is capable of 
reducing the relevant transaction costs that are considered necessary for efficient 
markets. The IRIS data set then aggregates these indices into a single ‘property rights 
index’ that ranges from 0 (the poorest conditions for market efficiency) to 50 (the best 
conditions). This index therefore measures a range of market-enhancing governance 
conditions and is very useful (within the standard limitations of all subjective data 
sets) for testing the significance of market-enhancing governance conditions for 
economic development. Annual data are available from 1984 for most countries.  
 
A second data set that has become very important for testing the role of market-
enhancing governance comes from Kaufmann’s team (Kaufmann, et al. 2005) and is 
available for most countries from 1996 onwards on the World Bank’s website (World 
Bank 2005a). This data aggregates a large number of indices available in other data 
sources into six broad governance indicators. These are: 
1. Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights 
2. Political Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or 
changes in, government, including terrorism 
3. Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the 
quality of public service delivery 
4. Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
5. Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
6. Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, 
including both petty and grand corruption and state capture. 
 
We have divided the countries for which data are available into three groups. 
“Advanced countries” are high-income countries using the World Bank’s 
classification with the exception of two small oil economies (Kuwait and the UAE), 
which we classify as developing countries. This is because although they have high 
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levels of per capita income from oil sales, they have low capacities of producing their 
own wealth compared to other high-income countries. From the perspective of 
understanding the relationship between governance and growth, the small number of 
developing countries that have enjoyed significant natural resource windfalls should 
really be classified as developing countries. We also divide the group of developing 
countries into a high and low growth group. We define “diverging developing 
countries” as the ones whose per capita GDP growth rate is lower than the median 
growth rate of the advanced country group, and “converging developing countries” 
are ones whose per capita GDP growth rate is higher than the median advanced 
country rate.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the available data for the 1980s from the Knack-IRIS dataset. For 
the decade of the 1980s, the earliest property right index available in this dataset for 
most countries is for 1984. Table 3 shows data from the same source for the 1990s. A 
very similar result is achieved using the six governance indices from the Kaufmann-
World Bank data set (for a full set of data plots see Khan 2006b). Figures 6–7 show 
the same data in graphical form. These tables and plots show some remarkable 
patterns and demonstrate that market-enhancing governance conditions cannot explain 
much of the differences in growth rates between developing countries. Box 3 
summarizes the main empirical features of the available data sets. 
 
Box 3. Summary of what the data tells us  
 
i) There is virtually no difference between the median property rights index 
between converging and diverging developing countries 
 
ii) The range of governance observed in converging and diverging developing 
countries almost entirely overlaps 
 
iii) The positive slope of the regression line in the pooled data is therefore 
misleading and  
 
iv) The market-enhancing governance indicators do not help to identify the 
critical governance differences between converging and diverging developing 
countries. 
 
The absence of any clear separation between converging and diverging developing 
countries in terms of market-enhancing governance conditions casts doubt on the 
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robustness of the econometric results referred to earlier that find market-enhancing 
governance conditions have had a significant effect on economic growth. It suggests 
that the positive relationship routinely identified in econometric studies depends on 
different types of specification problems. In many studies, the problem is that the 
sample includes a large number of advanced countries having high scores on market-
enhancing governance (shown as diamonds in Figures 6–7) while the bulk of 
developing countries are low-growth and low scoring on market-enhancing 
governance (triangles in Figures 6–7). However, if we only look at these countries, we 
are unable to say anything about the direction of causality as we have good theoretical 
reasons to expect market-enhancing governance to improve in countries with high per 
capita incomes. The critical countries for establishing the direction of causality are the 
converging developing countries (squares in Figures 6–7). By and large, these 
countries do not have significantly better market-enhancing governance scores than 
diverging developing countries. This is particularly striking when we use the Knack-
IRIS data on aggregate property rights for the 1990s, which is the only period and 
data set for which we have a governance indicator at the beginning of a relatively 
long period of growth.  
 
The policy implications of these observations are rather important. Given the large 
degree of overlap in the market-enhancing governance scores achieved by converging 
and diverging developing countries, we need to significantly qualify the claim made 
in much of the governance literature that an improvement in market-enhancing 
governance quality in diverging countries will lead to a significant improvement in 
their growth performance. These conclusions are often derived mechanically from the 
small positive slope of regression lines, without looking at the weak relationship or 
the distribution of developing countries in the way we have done.  
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Table 2. Market-Enhancing Governance: Composite Property Rights Index  
(Knack-IRIS dataset) and Economic Growth 1980-90 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  21 52 12 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1984 45.1 22.5 27.8 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 25.1 – 49.6 9.4 – 39.2 16.4 – 37.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1980-90 2.2 -1.0 3.5 
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance 
conditions to a high of 50 for the best conditions. 
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b). 
 
 
 
Table 3. Market-Enhancing Governance: Composite Property Rights Index  
(Knack-IRIS dataset) and Economic Growth 1990-2003 
 Advanced Countries 
Diverging 
Developing 
Countries  
Converging 
Developing 
Countries  
Number of Countries  24 53 35 
Median Property Rights 
Index 1990 47.0 25.0 23.7 
Observed range of Property 
Rights Index 32.3 – 50.0 10 – 38.3 9.5 – 40.0 
Median Per Capita GDP 
Growth Rate 1990-2003 2.1 
0.4 3.0 
The IRIS Property Rights Index can range from a low of 0 for the worst governance 
conditions to a high of 50 for the best conditions. 
Sources: IRIS-3 (2000), World Bank (2005b). 
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Figure 7 Aggregate property rights and growth 1990-2003 
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Clearly, there are significant differences in growth rates between developing 
countries, and these suggest significant differences in the efficiency of resource 
allocation and use. Moreover, we agree with the general premise of institutional and 
governance policy that these differences are very likely to be related to significant 
differences in governance capabilities between converging and diverging developing 
countries. Based on Khan (2004), figure 8 summarizes the data plots in figures 6–7, 
and also shows what we may be missing by using the data in a particular way. The 
data suggests that differences in market-enhancing governance capabilities are not 
significant between converging and diverging countries, and that the relationships 
within the data may actually be telling us something about the importance of other 
dimensions of governance capabilities that could explain differences in growth 
performance.  
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The reform agenda identified by the good governance theories uses the data to argue 
that improvements in growth performance require a prior improvement in market-
promoting governance. But this conclusion is based on a statistical result that is 
misleading as it pools countries and does not adequately adjust for initial conditions. 
The data is actually telling us that no developing country achieved advanced country 
governance characteristics as measured by market-promoting governance. But in fact, 
converging and diverging developing countries do not differ in terms of these 
indicators. The interesting governance differences are more likely to be ones that have 
been discussed in the literature on catching up and developmental states, and we need 
to return to that literature to see if any significant governance differences have been 
identified that are consistent with the case study and other empirical evidence.  
 
 
Box 4. Similarities and differences with Sachs’ analysis of governance 
 
Our results are entirely consistent with Sachs et al. (2004) who show that when 
initial incomes are taken into account, (market-enhancing) governance quality 
does not explain any significant part of growth differences within Africa. A 
similar conclusion is reached by Glaeser et al. (2004) in a wide ranging 
examination of market-enhancing governance indicators and economic 
performance. 
 
However, we do not conclude like Sachs and Glaeser that governance is 
therefore a red herring. Our argument is that governance does matter, but we are 
looking at the wrong kinds of governance. There are indeed no significant 
market-enhancing governance differences between group 1 and group 2 
countries in Figure 14, but there may be significant growth-enhancing 
governance differences that we should be looking for.  
 
 
3. Growth-Enhancing Governance and Economic Growth. 
The good governance agenda ignores a number of critical structural challenges faced 
by developing countries going through the transformation from low productivity pre-
capitalist societies to higher productivity capitalist ones. We review four structural 
features of developing countries that require very different governance capabilities if 
developing countries are to make successful and sustainable transformations into 
higher productivity economies.  
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The first governance capability is required to manage the structurally weak property 
rights that characterize developing countries. Theory and evidence suggests that 
contrary to good governance theory, the weakness of property rights in developing 
countries is structural and not due to the greed of political leaderships or their 
inadequate political will in enforcement. Countries differ widely in the capabilities of 
their governments to manage these weak property rights in ways that enable the 
emergence of a productive capitalism.  
 
Secondly, emerging capitalists in developing countries face a structural problem with 
acquiring the tacit knowledge and learning that is essential for achieving international 
competitiveness. Achieving these capabilities requires complementary governance 
capabilities on the part of the state to manage incentives and opportunities for 
technological catching up, while creating compulsions for capitalists not to waste 
resources. Countries differ widely in these capabilities. 
 
Thirdly, developing countries suffer from structural political corruption due to the 
difficulty of managing political stabilization using fiscal processes. This explains the 
widespread role of political corruption and patron-client politics in developing 
countries. The common analysis of neo-patrimonialism in developing countries points 
to the need to move beyond patron-client politics. But this ignores the fact that 
modern political systems require significant fiscal resources if political competition is 
to focus on how to spend the budget, resources that are just not available in any 
developing country. As a result, even the most successful developing countries could 
not be characterized as Weberian states. Success in economic transformation has 
rather required governance capabilities in managing patron-client politics in ways that 
allow political stability sufficient for capitalist accumulation to continue. We now 
look at these issues in turn.  
 
Weak property rights and the prevalence of non-market asset transfers.  
A critical structural problem in many developing countries is that property rights 
across the board are weakly protected because of the limited public resources 
available for defining and protecting property rights. In much of the conventional 
analysis of governance and corruption in developing countries, it is implicitly 
 22
assumed that the protection of property rights can be dramatically improved through 
governance reforms and by reducing corruption. This analysis ignores the economic 
fact that constructing a nation-wide system of stable property rights is an extremely 
costly enterprise. Advanced countries only achieved significant stability in their 
property rights at a relatively late stage of their development when most assets had 
achieved high levels of productivity (Khan 2002, 2004, 2006a).  
 
There is considerable controversy within institutional economics about whether stable 
and well-defined property rights are a precondition for growth. In an influential paper 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that the achievement of stable property rights centuries 
ago enabled some countries to become prosperous while others who failed to achieve 
these conditions did not. This argument uses proxy indicators to measure the stability 
of property rights a century or more ago. Their now-famous indicator is the relative 
frequency of deaths of white settlers in different parts of Africa that determined 
whether or not Europeans set up settler colonies with stable property rights. Where 
malaria deaths were high, white settlers did not come but they set up extractive 
colonies where property rights were destabilized by colonial powers. This analysis is 
seductive in its use of innovative statistical techniques but suffers from serious 
historical problems. Most significantly, the countries where settlers went did not 
enjoy stable property rights while the settlers were taking over these societies. Indeed, 
they suffered from precipitous collapses of traditional property rights as large tracts of 
land were expropriated by the colonial settlers. In some cases the expropriation was so 
severe and rapid that indigenous populations collapsed entirely, sometimes in 
genocidal proportions. To describe this as the establishment of stable property rights 
does violence to the historical facts.  
 
It is more accurate to say that where the transformation of property rights to capitalist 
ones happened very rapidly, capitalist economies emerged earlier than in other cases 
where the process of property right transformation is still going on. The rapid 
emergence of viable capitalist economies then allowed property rights to be protected 
and become stable in the way we would expect. In one sense, we could even argue 
that property rights were more stable in the non-settler countries because a precipitous 
historical rupture did not occur there. The problem for these countries is that similar 
property right transitions have to be organized today, but we hope with less violence 
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and more justice. Of course once a viable capitalism becomes established, property 
rights become well protected. In settler colonies this happened quite a long time ago, 
but the stability of property rights across the board in these societies did not predate 
the establishment of a productive capitalism. In other words, Acemoglu et al.’s 
argument suffers from exactly the type of causality problem as the good governance 
arguments we discussed earlier, despite their use of more sophisticated econometrics 
and proxy variables.  
 
The unlikelihood of establishing stable property rights in developing countries before 
the establishment of a productive capitalism is actually well supported by New 
Institutional Economics. However, most researchers subscribing to this school have 
argued that modern economies emerged as a result of stable property rights being 
established. But in fact, one of the significant conclusions of the New Institutional 
Economics introduced by Douglass North and others was to point out that the 
protection and exchange of property rights is an extremely costly business. These 
costs are part of the transaction costs of a market economy, and New Institutional 
Economics pointed out that in advanced economies, transaction costs may account for 
as much as half of all economic activity (North and Wallis 1987; North 1990).  
 
An efficient economy has slightly lower transaction costs than others, but not zero 
transaction costs or anything approaching that. In an efficient market economy 
transaction costs may be low for individual transactors at the point of exchange (this 
is the definition of an efficient market) but collective transaction costs for the 
economy as a whole are not low at all. These collective transaction costs can be paid 
because almost all assets in an advanced country are productive (by definition) and so 
owners can pay taxes and incur the private expenditures on legal and security systems 
that ensure that at the point of exchange, transaction costs are low. In a developing 
country, most assets are of low productivity and cannot pay the cost of their own 
protection. It is not surprising that every developing country suffers from contested 
and weak property rights. 
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Figure 9 Drivers of property right instability in developing countries 
Figure 9 shows the drivers of this governance failure in graphical form. When most of 
the assets in a country have not yet achieved high productivity uses (which is by 
definition the case in a developing or transition economy), it is difficult to imagine 
how the protection of property rights across the board can be paid for. Developing 
countries have to live with a much higher degree of property right instability 
compared to advanced countries, but this is not entirely or even largely due to the 
greed and discretion of their public officials. When property rights are not secure to 
any satisfactory extent, and transaction costs at the point of exchange are high, 
inevitably many transactions will be too expensive to conduct through the market. 
This would be the case even with honest officials and transparent political processes, 
but in fact officials and politicians are also likely to exploit opportunities provided by 
such a context. How they do this, and the capacities and incentives they have to 
govern this process determine the outcomes. Thus, while non-market transfers are 
ubiquitous and much more significant in developing compared to advanced countries, 
the outcomes of these processes can be radically different across countries, as figure 9 
summarizes.  
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Non-market transfers include not just high profile cases of appropriation and theft 
using political power, but also cases of legal non-market transfers through land 
reform, state allocation of land for development, and the use of the right of eminent 
domain in allocating public resources. The right of eminent domain is regularly used 
to transfer assets even in advanced countries when the transaction costs of market 
transaction would be too high. For instance, when a road is to be constructed, the 
transaction cost of purchasing many small plots of land and negotiating prices with 
individual owners would be too high. In these cases, the state uses its right of eminent 
domain to fix a price for the affected land through bureaucratic processes and then 
purchases the land using compulsory purchase orders. The only difference in 
developing countries is that the range of asset transfers where market transaction costs 
would be too high is even greater because of the many property rights that are 
contested or otherwise difficult to transact.  
 
Non-market asset transfers of different types can thus be structurally necessary in 
developing countries but do open up the possibility of abuse and corruption. But they 
are not likely to be stopped by simply addressing the greed and discretion of public 
officials as there are deeper structural factors driving these processes. Rather, the 
critical issue for policy is that the outcomes of these non-market asset transfers can 
result in a successful transition to a modern capitalist economy or to predation and 
loss of resources to overseas tax havens. The governance capabilities that are relevant 
here are the institutional and political factors that ensure that non-market transfers 
enable investment in productive enterprises.  
 
The case study evidence strongly supports our analysis. Not surprisingly, a significant 
part of the asset and resource re-allocations necessary for accelerating development in 
developing countries have taken place through semi-market or entirely non-market 
processes. These processes have been very diverse. Examples include the English 
Enclosures from the 16th to the 18th century; the creation of the chaebol in South 
Korea in the 1960s using transfers of public resources to these privileged groups; the 
creation of the Chinese TVEs using public resources in the 1980s and their 
privatization in the 1990s; and the allocation and appropriation of public land and 
resources for development in Thailand.  
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Successful developers have displayed a range of institutional and political capacities 
that enabled semi-market and non-market asset and property right re-allocations that 
were growth enhancing. In contrast in less successful developers, the absence of 
necessary governance capabilities meant that non-market transfers descended into 
predatory expropriation that impeded development. This analysis should not give us 
cause for complacency about the importance of governance. Rather it should direct 
our attention to a more critical set of governance reforms that are able to create stable 
expectations for critical sectors to enable accelerated investment and growth. In 
contrast, trying to implement reforms that attempt to achieve property right stability 
across the board in poor countries that lack the economic resources to make it 
feasible is likely only to result in frustration and eventually the abandonment of the 
reform programme. 
 
The significant differences between successful countries suggests that there are no 
general institutional characteristics that all successful countries possessed but rather 
that they used different institutional mechanisms to achieve some common outcomes 
(Rodrik 1999, 2002, 2003). We need to understand better why different institutional 
capabilities and incentives for non-market transfers have been effective in different 
contexts given differences in political organizations and structures.  
 
Catching up, technology acquisition and governance capabilities  
A significant reason why developing countries, even successful ones, persistently 
diverge from the efficient market model is that even reasonably efficient markets in 
developing countries face significant market failures when it comes to organizing 
learning to overcome low productivity in late developers (Khan 2000b). Growth in 
developing countries requires catching up through the acquisition of new technologies 
and learning to use these new technologies rapidly. Markets, even the most efficient 
ones possible in a developing country, are typically inadequate on their own for 
attracting capital and new technologies in high value-added sectors. Efficient markets 
generally attract capital and technology to countries where these technologies are 
already profitable because the requisite skills of workers and managers already exist.  
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In theory, free markets should lead to rapid convergence if capital could flow to 
developing countries to use their cheap labour. But this theory only works if labour 
productivity in developing countries is not so low that it wipes out their wage 
advantage. Unfortunately, there are relatively few sectors in developing countries 
where this is true, and in some countries, there may be no sectors at all where capital 
would voluntarily wish to come. The problem is not only due to infrastructure and 
governance, but more fundamental. Developing countries have lower technological 
capabilities and therefore lower labour productivity in most sectors compared to 
advanced countries, and this low productivity wipes out their wage advantage even 
without taking into account problems of infrastructure and governance. 
 
The real problem lies elsewhere, in a range of issues that economists have explained 
in terms of the time and effort it takes to achieve labour discipline, tacit knowledge 
and learning-by-doing. The knowledge about how to operate a modern factory at 
optimum or near-optimum efficiency has to be learned by both managers and workers 
by operating in the factory for a time, even if optimum efficiency cannot be 
immediately achieved. For instance, US productivity per worker in simple cotton 
spinning using identical technology was 7.8 times higher than Indian workers in 1978. 
And even in 1990 Indian textile workers were achieving 25% of US productivity in 
1959 (Clark and Wolcott 2002). These massive differences can help to explain why 
there was so little inward investment in India during its period of virtually free trade 
with Britain during the colonial period. In addition, during the colonial period there 
were virtually no tariffs or restrictions on capital inflow or profit repatriation. 
Reproducing these colonial free trade conditions in developing countries today is 
likely to produce similar outcomes in the absence of growth-enhancing strategies to 
improve productive capacities in these countries.  
 
The productivity gap is less marked in low technology and low value-added sectors 
compared to higher technology and higher value-added sectors. This explains why 
when capital does come, or investment is organized within the developing country, it 
is almost always in lower technology and lower value-added activities. Productivity 
growth in low productivity sectors is in general slower than in higher productivity 
sectors. Compare for instance, the potential productivity growth in stitching garments 
compared to the potential productivity growth in making fabrics. This is not 
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necessarily true for every sector that starts from a low technology base, but there are 
theoretical reasons why we would expect it to be true. Technologies that are already 
very high productivity by definition have a lot of embedded technology in them, and 
these are technologies where incremental technological progress is most likely. This 
explains why countries can get trapped into low technology sectors from which there 
is no automatic escape till the productivity gap to the higher level technologies can be 
jumped. 
 
Overcoming the productivity gap is not just a question of setting up infant industries 
and letting them run, but also of setting up institutional compulsions that ensure that 
the effort involved in learning is forthcoming (Khan 2005a). This explains why 
catching-up strategies failed in almost every country except a few. The few that were 
different had institutions that could exert the requisite compulsions on learning sectors 
so that learning did happen and these countries moved rapidly up the technology 
ladder. 
 
These observations can help to explain why even with complete trade openness and 
protection of expatriate property rights, colonies like India did not do too well in 
terms of industrialization or poverty reduction in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Indeed, even in terms of property rights and general governance, India under colonial 
rule would score reasonably highly. Not only did India not catch up with Britain and 
other advanced countries during this century and a half, it fell precipitately behind. 
From 1873 to 1947 Indian per capita income declined from around 25% of US per 
capita income to under 10 per cent. This experience has been almost entirely forgotten 
with the resurgence of confidence in liberalization and market openness as strategies 
that will ensure moving up the technology ladder and reducing poverty in poor 
countries.  
 
The empirical evidence that is available from relatively successful developing 
countries suggests that the opportunities and compulsions for learning can be created 
by very different types of institutions and policies. Opportunities were created using 
many different mechanisms including tariff protection (in virtually every case but to 
varying extents), direct subsidies (in particular in South Korea), subsidized and 
prioritized infrastructure for priority sectors (in China and Malaysia), and subsidizing 
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the licensing of advanced foreign technologies (in Taiwan). With the advent of a new 
consensus on international trade through the WTO, tariff protection is no longer an 
option for most developing countries, but historical experience tells us that this is not 
the only way, or even the most effective way in which to organize support for the 
learning processes through which productivity is raised in catch-up sectors. The 
common feature of successful learning strategies was the ability to create compulsions 
for successful learning because states had the institutional and political capacity to 
ensure that non-performance was not tolerated for too long (Amsden 1989; Khan 
2000a).  
Rent seeking/corruption appears as 
“benign” profit-sharing with public 
officials (South Korea, China)
Productivity gap 
preventing moves up the 
technology ladder
Effective Rent-Management/
Credible Exit Strategies: Rapid 
technological progress 
Rent seeking/corruption appears as 
a “malign” process that protects 
the inefficient and the socially 
powerful
Failed Implementation/Permanent 
Rent Capture by “Infant” 
Industries: Stalled progress
Strategies of rent capture/
subsidization in sectors 
attempting catching up
 
Figure 10 Governance Capabilities and Catching up through Technical Progress  
 
 
The mechanisms through which this was achieved were very different in different 
countries, but the common feature of success was that failure led to corrective action 
that was effective. For instance, in South Korea, not only could subsidies be 
withdrawn, but failing enterprises were rapidly transferred to new ownership. In 
Malaysia, managements of public enterprises could be changed rapidly (compared to 
other developing countries) and private investors faced declining benefits over time. 
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These compulsions were in turn credible because investors knew they could not 
protect themselves by buying factional political support. The mechanisms that 
ensured compulsions for learning in successful countries are, however, not well 
enough understood or studied and there is a need for careful research in these areas.  
 
Figure 10 shows that in the context of productivity differentials that cannot be 
overcome without non-market facilitation, there are strong incentives for emerging 
entrepreneurs to create these possibilities for themselves through the exercise of 
political power through the state. As soon as this happens, rent seeking and corruption 
are likely to emerge. The real difference in governance with respect to the 
management of learning processes (between successful and less successful countries) 
has not been the presence of rent seeking and corruption in some cases and its absence 
in others (both the left and right hand forks in figure 10 are associated with rent 
seeking and possibly corruption). The real difference is rather that only a few 
countries had governance capabilities that created opportunities and compulsions for 
technological progress. The identification of these capabilities is critical to see how 
they can be replicated in different political and institutional contexts.  
 
If the requisite governance capacities for effective rent management are missing, a 
growth-enhancing strategy that implicitly creates rents to accelerate learning may 
deliver worse outcomes than a market-led strategy. Badly managed rents can mean 
permanently poor resource allocation as well as high rent-seeking costs. But even a 
failed growth strategy can sometimes have unintended consequences that are 
potentially useful if it develops human capital even though it fails to profitably 
employ these resources. These can often be exploited in new ways if the growth 
strategy fails. The interactive relationship between growth strategies, governance 
capabilities and technological capabilities of producers can help to explain:  
 
a) why many different strategies of industrial catching up were successful in East 
Asia,  
b) why at the same time apparently similar growth-enhancing strategies have worked 
in some countries and failed dismally in others,  
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c) why some countries like India have done reasonably well with liberalization by 
using some of the capacities developed by previous growth strategies in new ways 
and  
d) why other countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America have fared rather 
less well in terms of growth after liberalization when they allowed markets to 
significantly guide resource allocation to areas of current comparative advantage. In 
Latin America liberalization has in many cases resulted in a shift towards less 
productive technologies in manufacturing or towards commodity production.  
 
The success of liberalization in a number of countries, including India and Chile in 
the 1980s can also be explained rather better from this perspective. Growth in these 
newly liberalizing countries occurred in three types of sectors. First, there was growth 
in a small number of sectors that had already acquired international competitiveness 
like parts of India’s machine tools or pharmaceutical sectors. These sectors had been 
beneficiaries of previous technology acquisition strategies, and benefited from the 
physical and human capital accumulation that had taken place earlier. Secondly, there 
was growth in low value-added sectors that benefited from the capital accumulation 
and entrepreneurial skills that had been accumulated in the previous period. Examples 
of these sectors include ready-made garments and grey cloths. They also include 
relatively low value-added sectors like call centres that benefited from human capital 
that had been created for high value uses (call centres in India are often manned by 
university graduates). And finally, liberalization allowed some countries to grow by 
exporting commodities or natural resources. Success in these sectors was dramatic in 
some cases because they benefited from the growth in demand for commodities in the 
US and China. 
 
Box 5 Liberalization can unleash unused technological capabilities but how 
sustainable is this growth? 
If countries lack governance capabilities to sustain productivity growth in 
technology acquisition strategies, these strategies eventually fail. The 
experience of the Indian subcontinent from 1947 to the mid-1960s fits this 
pattern. Liberalization (defined simply as the abandonment of these strategies) 
can allow the technological capabilities that have been built up to be re-
allocated to new uses to meet global demands and can lead to a growth spurt. 
Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani growth in the 1980s had these characteristics.  
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But there are areas of concern about the sustainability of the new growth model.  
 
In India, we know that productivity growth in the manufacturing sector 
throughout the eighties was not driven by efficiency improvements in existing 
manufacturing capabilities, but rather by closing down subsidized sectors and 
developing new sectors that used human and physical capital in new value 
chains where India typically fitted in at a lower point in the global chain (Neogi 
and Ghosh 1998; Das 2004).  
 
For Indian manufacturing as a whole, productivity growth was moderate to low 
throughout the 1980s, suggesting that growth was not driven by the 
development of high-technology sectors, though there were pockets of high 
value-added in software in particular (Srivastava 2000; Goldar 2004).  
 
Learning in the new model is not driven by the management of rents for 
learning, but by foreign technology transfers organized by the private sector 
through foreign linkups. The critical observation here is that even with foreign 
linkups, productivity growth only happened in the small number of sectors 
where the Indian partner was already fairly technologically advanced 
(Siddhartan and Lal 2004). In contrast, in China, the state can step in to provide 
incentives and infrastructure on terms that can be used to attract medium-
technology manufacturing sectors that allows China to keep expanding its 
manufacturing learning-by-doing.  
 
These observations are entirely consistent with our argument that the unfettered 
market works for technology transfers where the developing country partner is 
already advanced, but does not work for developing country partners where 
significant learning has to be organized to compensate for large initial 
productivity differentials. These observations should warn us not to be too 
sanguine about the rate of spread of high value jobs even in relatively advanced 
developing countries like India that are now following market-driven 
technology acquisition strategies. Countries lower down the technology scale 
like Bangladesh or Uganda are much more vulnerable.  
 
 
The liberalization in the Indian subcontinental countries has to be distinguished from 
China, which emerged as the fastest growing economy in recorded history in a context 
of gradual and measured liberalization. To a far greater extent than other countries, 
including India, China combined growth-enhancing strategies with market-promoting 
strategies to move into mid-technology manufacturing. Many aspects of the 
successful growth-enhancing strategies of the past continue to be effectively 
implemented and appropriate growth-enhancing governance capabilities exist to 
implement them effectively. These strategies include the strategies of local and central 
government in China to make land and infrastructure available on a priority basis to 
investors in critical sectors, and to offer fiscal incentives and attractive terms to both 
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foreign and overseas Chinese investors engaging in investments critical for economic 
progress (Qian and Weingast 1997).  
 
These ‘subsidized’ inputs allow Chinese firms to set up in global production before 
they have necessarily achieved global competitiveness as determined by the market. 
Indeed, Indian manufactures complain bitterly at the way in which Chinese 
manufacturing can enter markets at below the ‘true’ cost of production to establish 
economies of scale and learning advantages. Thus, while compared to the earlier 
generation of East Asian developers, the Chinese state appears to be doing less in 
terms of actively supporting technology upgrading, it still has very strong institutional 
capacities to ensure the allocation of land, resources and infrastructure to critical 
investors and to ensure that unproductive firms are not able to retain support. With its 
vast internal market and the broad-based technological capabilities it has already 
achieved, Chinese manufacturing has been able to acquire scale economies that enable 
it to compete in price almost without challenge in the low to mid-technology 
manufacturing industries.  
 
In contrast, the countries of the Indian subcontinent have had a different experience 
with liberalization. Here, previous growth-enhancing strategies had succeeded in 
creating technological capabilities that were less broad-based than in China. Political 
fragmentation was much greater and the governance capabilities of states to direct 
resources to investors were significantly lower than in China. As in China, 
liberalization in the textbook sense has proceeded at a very slow pace. Growth has 
been led by sectors that had already achieved the minimum technological capability 
for international competition taking the opportunity to start producing aggressively for 
domestic and international markets. The results were higher growth rates than in the 
past, led by a small number of sectors that had acquired enough technological 
capability to enjoy comparative advantage in international markets. These sectors 
differed across South Asia, ranging from the garment industry and shrimps in 
Bangladesh, low-end textiles in Pakistan to diamond polishing, call centres and 
software in India. India’s global presence has been exaggerated by the outward 
investments of a small number of Indian multinational companies, which were more 
interested in purchasing high technology companies abroad than developing these 
capacities within India. But on the whole, South Asia has relatively weak growth-
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enhancing strategies and capabilities on the part of government, with the result that 
ongoing technology acquisition is much more narrowly focused, and driven by firms 
that are already quite advanced engaging in partnerships with foreign firms. This 
process has resulted in limited learning in new sectors in India compared to China, 
and even less in Pakistan and Bangladesh.  
 
Our analysis suggests that while it is desirable over time to improve market-enhancing 
governance, the comparison of liberalization in China and India suggests that market-
enhancing governance cannot explain their relative performance. Case studies of 
China and India do not suggest that China performed much better than India (if at all) 
along critical dimensions of market-enhancing governance such as the stability of 
property rights, corruption or the rule of law before it began its takeoff. Where it does 
do better is in having governance capacities for accelerating resource allocation to 
growth sectors, prioritizing infrastructure for these sectors, and in making credible 
and attractive terms available to investors bringing in advanced technologies, 
capabilities that we have described as growth-enhancing governance capabilities.  
 
Latin America provides even more compelling evidence that a focus on market-
enhancing governance alone cannot provide adequate policy levers for governments 
interested in accelerating growth and development. Compared to China and the Indian 
subcontinent, liberalization in Latin America has been more thoroughgoing and has 
extended in many cases to the liberalization of the capital account and much freer 
entry conditions for imports into the domestic market. In terms of market-enhancing 
governance, Latin America on average scores highly compared to other areas of the 
developing world. This is not surprising given higher per capita incomes, a much 
longer history of development, and relatively old institutions of political democracy 
(even though in many cases these institutions were for a while subverted by military 
governments).  
 
Yet its more developed market-enhancing governance capabilities and deeper 
liberalization did not help Latin America beat Asia in terms of economic development 
in the 1990s and beyond. In fact, relative performance was exactly the opposite of 
what we would expect from the relative depth of its liberalization strategy and its 
relative governance indicators. This should not be entirely surprising given our 
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analysis. Latin American countries shifted even more rapidly to producing according 
to their comparative advantage, and in most Latin American countries this meant a 
shift to lower technology industries and to commodity production. This has produced 
respectable output growth in some countries, but productivity growth has been low. 
Latin America 
1950s to 1970s
Indian 
subcontinent 
1980s 1990s
Supportive or Obstructive 
Governance Capabilities
Critical Components of 
Technology Acquisition Strategy
Economic 
Outcomes
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to discipline non-
performing rent recipients. Agencies 
often have contradictory goals 
defined by different constituencies.
Fragmented political factions help to 
protect the rents of the inefficient for 
a share of these rents.
State capacities decline as committed 
public officials leave.
Targeted subsidies to accelerate 
catching up in critical sectors 
(using protection, licensing of 
foreign exchange, price controls 
and other mechanisms).
Public sector technology 
acquisition in subsidized public 
enterprises.
Resource transfers to growth 
sectors using licensing and pricing 
policy.
Public and private 
sector infant 
industries often fail 
to grow up.
Rent seeking costs 
are often the most 
visible effects of 
intervention.
Moderate to low 
growth and slow 
transformation
Indian 
subcontinent 
1960s 1970s
(With some 
variations these 
characteristics 
describe many 
developing 
countries of that 
period)
Malaysia 
1980s 1990s
Moderately effective centralized 
governance.
Assisted by centralized transfers to 
intermediate classes which reduced 
incentives of political factions to seek 
rents by protecting inefficient firms. 
Public sector technology 
acquisition by public enterprises 
with diffusion to private sector 
firms through subcontracting.
 Targeted infrastructure and other 
incentives for MNCs with 
conditions for technology transfer. 
Rapid growth and 
capitalist 
transformation
Latin America 
1980s onwards
Breakdown of corporatist alliances 
allows liberalization to be 
implemented (to varying extents in 
different countries).
Rapid liberalization across the 
board.
Output growth in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage, in 
particular in 
commodities.
Non-market asset allocations to 
growth drivers (consolidations, 
mergers and restructuring of 
).
Targeted conditional subsidies for 
 to accelerate catching-up.
chaebol
chaebol
Very rapid growth 
and capitalist 
transformation
South Korea
1960s to early 
1980s
Centralized governance by agencies 
with long-term stake in 
development.
Effective implementation assisted by 
weakness of political factions so that 
inefficient subsidy recipients are 
unable to buy protection from them.
Liberalization primarily in the form 
of a withdrawal of implicit targeted 
subsidies, in particular through the 
relaxation of licensing for capital 
goods imports.
Much more gradual withdrawal of 
protection across the board for 
domestic markets.
Moderate to weak governance 
capacities to implement remain but 
do less damage as the scope of 
growth enhancing policies decline.
Fragmented political factions 
continue to have an effect on market-
enhancing governance by restricting 
tax revenues and making it difficult 
to construct adequate infrastructure.
Growth led by 
investments in 
sectors that already 
have comparative 
advantage.
Higher growth but 
limited to a few 
sectors.
Domestic capacity building 
through selective tariffs and 
selective credit allocation.
Governance effective in directing 
resources to import-substituting 
industries but weak in disciplining 
poor performers. 
Weakness linked to “corporatist” 
alliances that constrained 
disciplining powerful sectors.
Initial rapid growth 
slows down. 
Many infant 
industries fail to 
grow up.
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Table 4 Technology acquisition strategies and experiences 
 Table 4 summarizes several historical observations to highlight some of the key 
characteristics of successful and less successful technology acquisition strategies. The 
technology acquisition strategies of the sixties and seventies produced dramatic 
success but only in countries that by good fortune happened to have the institutional 
and political conditions that allowed them to create both opportunities and 
compulsions for rapid learning. In other developing countries, similar strategies 
allowed high levels of accumulation and more rapid growth than under imperial rule 
when free markets dominated. But they did not achieve the productivity growth that 
would have allowed their emerging industries to become truly viable for facing 
international competition. The eventual fiscal crisis that some of the less successful 
countries faced as a result of the failure to discipline non-performing industries led to 
strategies of liberalization being adopted in many of these countries. And finally, 
liberalization in some countries that had achieved some success with technology 
acquisition allowed growth spurts to begin in the 1980s in the Indian subcontinent and 
parts of Latin America. 
 
This complex picture suggests that in figure 8, the group of converging countries 
shown as group 2 includes countries of several different types and not all of them may 
be enjoying sustainable growth. Some are countries that have sustainable technology 
acquisition strategies and are therefore on sustainable growth paths based on 
continuous productivity growth and the maintenance of competitiveness and 
improvements in living standards. But group 2 countries could also include countries 
attempting technology acquisition without adequate governance capabilities to make 
this truly sustainable. For instance, Pakistan in the early 1960s was a converging 
country, but its growth spurt was unsustainable because its growth-enhancing 
governance capabilities were not adequate for ensuring the successful implementation 
of its technology acquisition strategy. And today, group 2 countries include several 
that have abandoned technology acquisition strategies in the formal sense, but which 
are growing rapidly because they have already acquired physical and human capital in 
some niche sectors that give them international competitiveness. The long term 
sustainability of these strategies is also open to question.  
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By integrating into global markets and production chains using already competitive 
sectors, some liberalizing countries have achieved significant growth rates and joined 
the converging group in the 1980s and 1990s. The question is whether countries like 
Bangladesh or Uganda that have enjoyed convergence growth rates in the 1990s have 
discovered a new growth strategy that dispenses with a technology acquisition 
strategy, or are these spurts going to prove short-lived, as much of the historical 
evidence on purely market-driven growth would suggest. If we assume that some 
countries in group 2 are on sustainable convergence paths while others are not, we 
need to identify the governance conditions that differentiate them. Clearly good 
governance does not help us very much in this respect, because as we have already 
discussed, the countries in group 2 have the same mean and dispersion as group 1. 
Our hunch is that the sustainable sub-group within group 2 are the countries that have 
a sustainable technology acquisition strategy based on effective governance 
capabilities to effectively implement the strategy they are following. This is a critical 
research and policy question that needs to be examined further.  
 
Of course, it would be simplistic to suggest that within group 2 there are countries that 
do have the governance capabilities to follow a technology acquisition strategy, and 
others who have no capability to implement technology acquisition strategies. Even 
countries that are following largely market-driven growth strategies have elements of 
formal or informal strategies to promote technology acquisition and discipline these 
processes. This is particularly the case in countries like India where government-
business relationships are quite well-developed in pockets. But there are elements of 
informal government-business relationships in countries like Bangladesh that also 
assist some sectors to acquire technology by gaining temporary advantages that allow 
them to start producing before achieving international competitiveness. It is also 
important for policy to identify these processes and examine how policy can assist in 
deepening these trends. 
 
Governance and the management of political stability  
One of the main reasons why developing countries as a group diverge so significantly 
from good governance conditions is that their political systems do not operate with 
formal and transparent rules for public officials that ensure their accountability to 
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elected bodies. There is a large and growing gap between the reality of developing 
country politics and the policy prescriptions coming from good governance theory. 
Once again, the question is why this is so systematic. 
Personalized 
Political 
Power
Clientelism and 
Patron-Client 
Politics
 Politically 
Driven 
Accumulation
Economic 
and Political 
Under-
Development
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization
Description of Rent-Seeking in 
Developing Countries
Informal rather 
than Formal 
Institutions
Widespread 
Corruption
Creation of 
Rents
Absence of 
Democracy and 
Accountability
Economic 
inequality and 
dependence
 
Figure 11 The neo-patrimonial analysis of the causes and effects of patron-client politics 
A powerful set of analyses of the political economy problems of developing countries 
comes from the neo-patrimonial school that sets up a contrast between typical 
developing country political structures with the Weberian ideal of a rational and 
formal state based on impersonal political relationships (Eisenstadt 1973; Médard 
2002). The core argument of this emerging analysis was that the absence of 
democracy and accountability in developing countries allowed political bosses to use 
personalized power to run patron-client networks with their clients. This explained the 
persistence of patron-client politics, the importance of informal rather than formal 
rules and widespread corruption. The result of these processes was the politically 
driven accumulation that produced economic and political underdevelopment in 
developing countries. The main links in this argument are show in figure 11. The 
early theory has been added to by subsequent analysis that has focused on the 
contribution of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and economic inequalities in 
perpetuating personalized politics and its damaging effects (Engerman and Sokoloff 
2002; Blair 2005; Barbone, et al. 2006).   
 
The policy conclusion of these approaches is that democratization and other strategies 
to weaken personalized politics will weaken the hold of patron-client politics and 
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move these economies towards modern polities. However, there is a growing 
recognition that in the presence of severe ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
democratization may not work in weakening patron-client politics, and may even 
strengthen these tendencies (Barbone, et al. 2006). Moreover, as Barbone et al. point 
out, sometimes patron-client politics appears to operate even in the absence of 
fractionalization (as in Tunisia or Bangladesh). However, the expectation is that 
patron-client politics is avoidable in developing countries, that there are specific 
institutional failures that enable its continuation, and that the desirable and achievable 
state of affairs is a democracy that is accountable, with political institutions that work 
on principles of impersonal politics (AFD, et al. 2005). Such a political system is an 
integral part of the good governance framework described in figure 5. 
 
The problem is that no examples exist of such a state of politics in the developing 
world. Even in India, the world’s most attractive model of a working and sustainable 
democracy in a developing country, we know that the Indian political system is riven 
with corruption, that patron-client politics rules, and that economic reform when it 
happens, takes place because reformers can work the patron-client system, not 
because they have overcome its limitations by progressing towards a modern 
Weberian political system (Jenkins 2000; Harriss-White 2003; Khan 2005b). 
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Political Collapse and 
End of Accumulation
Sufficient Political Stability for 
Growth and Accumulation to Continue
Politically Driven 
Corruption to Raise 
Off-Budget 
Resources
Political Stabilization using 
Off-Budget Resources and 
Patron-Client Networks
Severely limited 
Fiscal Resources
Poor Economy 
(Largely Pre-Capitalist)
Governance 
Capabilities of 
Managing Patron-
Client politics
 
An alternative explanation for the persistence of patron-client politics is developed in 
(Khan 2005b). The alternative argument is that there are significant structural factors 
that make patron-client politics a rational response to the problem of maintaining 
political stability in a developing country. The main drivers of this type of politics are 
shown in figure 12. The critical constraint is that all developing countries suffer from 
limited fiscal resources (even apart from the political failures to collect tax) because 
by definition the development of their formal taxable sectors is limited. At the same 
time, managing political stability is even more demanding than in an advanced 
country because of the deep social dislocations caused by the economic and social 
transformations of development. The option of managing social stability through 
transparent and legal transfers through the fiscal system simply does not add up. This 
does not mean that tax collection cannot be increased and that this would not help the 
situation. But in most developing countries, feasible increases in tax collection would 
not solve the fundamental problem that the tax take would still be insufficient to pay 
for all necessary services and still be able to pay for the necessary political 
stabilization of society through transparent fiscal transfers.  
Figure 12 Structural drivers of patron-client politics 
 
The recourse to patron-client politics as a universal response in all developing 
countries regardless of culture, politics or economic strategies can be better explained 
by this fundamental structural driver. Patron-client politics makes sense because it 
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allows the governing group to identify the most critical, the best organized, the most 
troublesome, or simply the most dangerous constituencies and buy them off 
selectively. By definition, such a selective strategy of buying off specific 
constituencies cannot be done in a transparent way, and in any case the fiscal 
resources for satisfying even limited constituencies often do not exist in the budget. 
The most important politics in developing countries therefore often takes place off-
budget, with off-budget resources being raised for redistribution down patron-client 
networks.  
 
Sustainable growth paths in developing countries have not been associated with 
Weberian states behaving in impersonal and formal ways because all developing 
countries suffer from patron-client politics. Rather, sustainable high growth strategies 
have been associated with governance capabilities that allowed the maintenance of 
political stability through patron-client politics (as in contemporary India), while in 
other countries, political stability could not be maintained and a descent into political 
fragmentation took place. The governance challenge is to understand how in specific 
contexts, the management of political stability is being achieved using the historical 
endowments of institutions and power structures, and whether feasible changes in 
political institutions and political organizations can assist in strengthening political 
stabilization. Here too, the priorities of market-enhancing governance may be 
misplaced. What we need is a much better understanding of the types of patron-client 
networks through which political stabilization and political accumulation take place in 
different countries, so that governance interventions can be designed to improve 
sustainable growth and development outcomes.  
 
As with the other processes that we have discussed, success in managing political 
stabilization has depended on the compatibility of institutional structures with pre-
existing political structures of political organization and patron-client structures that 
are part of the political settlement. For instance, in the sixties attempts at authoritarian 
limitation of patron-client demands worked in South Korea but failed in Pakistan 
because the organization of patron-client networks in Pakistan was much stronger and 
more fragmented, requiring a degree of repression that was ultimately not feasible. In 
turn, the feasible strategy of political stabilization that was consistent with the 
political settlement in Pakistan limited the possibility of success of the technology 
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acquisition strategies that Pakistan was attempting at the time (Khan 1999). It is often 
forgotten that the South Korean technology acquisition strategy of providing 
conditional rents to learning industries in fact emerged first in Pakistan in the 1960s. 
Ironically, it proved impossible to effectively implement in Pakistan because the 
fragmented clientelism in that country allowed individual capitalists to buy 
themselves protection at a relatively low price. The absence of fragmented clientelism 
in South Korea, allowed the effective implementation of the same strategy that had 
failed in Pakistan. Malaysia too initially suffered from fragmented clientelism, but 
was able in the early 1980s to overcome this constraint through a change in the 
dominant political organizations. This change in the political settlement enabled a 
more centralized version of clientelism to emerge. Malaysia’s centralized clientelism 
of the 1980s, although it was still a costly system to run, allowed the implementation 
of a different type of learning strategy based on multinational companies with 
conditions and incentives for technology transfers and learning. These 
interdependencies between political stabilization strategies, learning strategies and 
asset transfer strategies are critical for devising feasible improvements in growth-
enhancing governance capabilities. Widening our knowledge of these 
interdependences will allow us to deepen our analytical and policy understanding of 
these processes. 
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